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INTRODUCTION
[1] In many ways, communicating by e-mail and other forms of electronic
transmission reflects a fundamentally different way of human interaction.
Historians eventually will put this in perspective, but one could easily
conclude that e-mails are essentially a “third way” for people to
communicate.
[2] From the dawn of time, people have communicated either orally or in
some permanent form. The former started with grunts among cavemen,
and now includes telephone calls. This oral tradition involves fleeting
communications, never meant to last. Oral communications convey
messages as much through body language or tone of voice as they do
through the actual words. The primeval human belief that these
communications should not be permanently recorded reflects itself in state
laws prohibiting one participant in a telephone call from tape recording
that call without the other’s consent.
[3] The permanent form of communication started with clay tablets, and
now includes faxes. Folks using this written tradition expect the writing to
last, and therefore usually (but not always) use care in choosing what they
write. The words themselves convey the meaning, perhaps slightly
supplemented by exclamation points, question marks, etc.
∗
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[4] E-mails combine these two forms of communication in a unique way.
They combine the informality and sometimes careless substance of oral
communications with the permanence of written communications. Emails have changed the way we communicate in three fundamental ways.
First, e-mails change the substance of our communications.
Unfortunately, for some litigants, e-mails can be easily misinterpreted.
What seemed like humor in an e-mail can later haunt the author.
Discovery now focuses on e-mail because that form of communication
captures litigants’ and witnesses’ unguarded thoughts in a way that
provides insight into their thinking.1
[5] Second, e-mails represent a fundamental change in the way we
communicate because they can be sent so easily. In many ways, this ease
of transmission represents a good development for most e-mail users. Emails allow users to stay in touch with family, friends, and business
associates more easily. E-mails make service industries (such as the legal
profession) more responsive to their clients. This ease of transmission,
however, carries downside risks for the sloppy and inattentive. In some
situations, the sender intends to transmit e-mails using this easy method.
It can be as easy to send an e-mail to one hundred recipients as it is to one
recipient. This has enormous ramifications for the attorney-client
privilege, which rests its protection on clients and lawyers communicating
only among themselves,2 or a very select group of others with a “need to
know.” Some recent decisions (which are outside the subject of this
article about ethics) have jeopardized every American corporation’s
attorney-client privilege, by finding that widespread intra-corporate
circulation of e-mails essentially demonstrates that the e-mails relate to a
business rather than a legal purpose.3
[6] Everyone has also sent e-mails to unintended recipients, often because
of the software that fills in the names of recipients after senders type in
1

See M. James Thomas, At the Intersection of Privilege and E-Discovery, 44 TENN. B.J.
14, 16 (2008) (“The amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on discovery
now apply to ESI, including individual e-mails, e-mail strings or strands, and soft copy
attachments.”).
2
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2000).
3
In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:06-md-1769-Orl-22DAB, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 39467, at *96 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 2008); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F.
Supp. 2d 789, 809-10 (E.D. La. 2007).
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just a few letters of an e-mail address. The law has always had to deal
with the inadvertent transmission of privileged or otherwise confidential
communications, but e-mails clearly exacerbate that problem.4
[7] Third, e-mails involve the astounding increase in volume of such
communications. The advent of copy machines might have created a
flood of communications, but e-mails have generated a tsunami. In
addition to all of the technological challenges that this huge increase in
volume generates, the law of discovery has had to keep up. The new Rule
502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence represents the latest attempt to
update discovery rules in light of the increasing amount of material that
litigants must review and produce.5
[8] As indicated above, the enormous changes triggered by e-mail
communication play out in many legal contexts—including the attorneyclient privilege, discovery rules, and elsewhere.6 This brief article
analyzes how the changes affect the ethics rules that guide the legal
profession’s conduct. It makes sense to focus on the audience with which
lawyers communicate by e-mail. First, and perhaps most importantly, the
ethics rules have had to deal with lawyers’ communications with their
clients’ adversaries. Second, ethics rules must deal with lawyers’
communications with third parties other than their adversaries. Third, the
ethics rules have had to adapt to a number of issues arising in litigation.
I. COMMUNICATING WITH ADVERSARIES
A. UNSOLICITED E-MAILS FROM PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS
[9] There may be no better example of the ethical impact of e-mails than
state bars’ efforts to analyze how they affect the very creation of an
attorney-client relationship. All lawyers know that they must preserve

4

See generally Thomas E. Spahn, Litigation Ethics in the Modern Age, 33 The Brief 2
(2004), available at http://www.mcguirewoods.com/newsresources/publications/commercial_litigation/LitigationEthics.Brief.33.2.Winter2004.pdf
(discussing the frequent inadvertent e-mail communications and the associated unethical
conduct).
5
See FED. R. EVID. 502.
6
See, e.g., PAUL R. RICE, Att’y-Client Privilege in the U.S. § 5:20 (West Group 1999).
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their clients’ confidences.7 Bars, however, have to deal with how lawyers
should handle confidential information they learn from prospective clients,
even if an attorney-client relationship never develops.8 Lawyers have
always faced this issue, but the advent of e-mails has allowed prospective
clients to easily transmit confidential communications to many lawyers.
Sometimes clients are legitimately seeking lawyers to represent them,
while others are cynically trying to disqualify lawyers who might
represent their adversaries.
[10] This scenario also implicates conflicts of interest rules, which supply
a fairly easy but seemingly harsh answer. Nationwide, bars have
repeatedly held that a lawyer who learns confidential information while
interviewing a prospective client cannot (absent consent) later be adverse
to the prospective client, even if no attorney-client relationship ever
arises.9
[11] This well-recognized principle requires lawyers who meet with or
otherwise receive information from prospective clients to walk a
“tightrope”—obtaining enough general information from the prospective
client to run a conflicts search, while not acquiring so much information
that the prospective client will be considered an actual client for conflicts
purposes.10 A number of law firms have learned to their regret that one of
their partners or associates crossed the line and created a disabling conflict
by acquiring too much information from a prospective client.
[12] A rule requiring a lawyer to maintain the confidentiality of
information received from a prospective client, however, makes much less
sense if the prospective client sends unsolicited information to the lawyer.
A strict application of the confidentiality and conflicts rules in such a
setting might tempt clever litigants to purposely taint their adversary’s
potential lawyers by sending unsolicited confidential information to them.
Still, the confidentiality rules do seem fairly strong even with prospective
clients who never become actual clients.

7

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a).
Id. R. 1.18(b).
9
See id. R. 1.18(c).
10
See id. R. 1.18(c)-(d).
8

4

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 4

[13] This issue becomes more complicated if the information obtained
from the prospective client is of interest to an existing client. In that
situation, the possible duty to keep the prospective client’s information
secret runs directly contrary to what would otherwise be a clear fiduciary
duty to reveal the material information to the existing client.11 If a lawyer
received information “on the street” that a plaintiff was about to file a
lawsuit against the lawyer’s client, fiduciary duties probably would require
the lawyer to immediately advise the client. Do these fiduciary duties
apply with equal force to an unsolicited e-mail from a prospective client?
The answer is unclear.
[14] Since the advent of e-mails, bars across America have dealt with this
issue—with mixed results. In 2001, the New York City Bar essentially
adopted the approach of Rule 1.18 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (discussed below).12 The New York City Bar took a
very lawyer-friendly approach.
Information imparted in good faith by a prospective client
to a lawyer or law firm in an e-mail generated in response
to an internet web site maintained by the lawyer or law firm
where such information is adverse to the interests of the
prospective client generally would not disqualify the law
firm from representing another present or future client in
the same matter. Where the web site does not adequately
warn that information transmitted to the lawyer or firm will
not be treated as confidential, the information should be
held in confidence by the attorney receiving the
communication and not disclosed to or used for the benefit
of the other client even though the attorney declines to
represent the potential client.13
In discussing law firms’ websites, the New York City Bar indicated that

11

See id. R. 1.7(a).
The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal
Op. 2001-1 (2001).
13
Id.
12
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The fact that the law firm maintained a web site does not,
standing alone, alter our view that the transmitted
information was unsolicited. The fact that a law firm’s web
site has a link to send an e-mail to the firm does not mean
that the firm has solicited the transmission of confidential
information from a prospective client. The Committee
believes that there is a fundamental distinction between a
specific request for, or a solicitation of, information about a
client by a lawyer and advertising a law firm’s general
availability to accept clients, which has been traditionally
done through legal directories, such as Martindale Hubbell,
and now is also routinely done through television, the print
media and web sites on the internet.14
The New York City Bar assured lawyers that a law firm website
disclaimer that
[P]rominently and specifically warns prospective clients
not to send any confidential information in response to the
web site because nothing will necessarily be treated as
confidential until the prospective client has spoken to an
attorney who has completed a conflicts check . . . would
vitiate any attorney-client privilege claim with respect to
information transmitted in the face of such a warning.15
[15] Several years later, the Nevada Bar took essentially the same
approach.16 In 2005, the Nevada Bar indicated that prospective clients
generally could not create an attorney-client relationship through a
“unilateral act” such as “sending an unsolicited letter containing
confidential information to the attorney.”17 The Nevada Bar explained
that a lawyer’s website disclaimer should effectively eliminate any

14

Id.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
16
See generally State Bar of Nev. Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal
Op. 32 (2005) (discussing the formation of the attorney-client relationship in the context
of the Internet and electronic communication).
17
Id.
15
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reasonable expectation of confidentiality by someone sending an
unsolicited e-mail to the lawyer.18
[16] In 2006, the San Diego Bar also took this approach, but in a different
factual context. In San Diego LEO 2006-1, the San Diego Bar addressed a
hypothetical situation in which a lawyer received an unsolicited e-mail.19
The Bar began its analysis by assuming that the lawyer did not have a
website and did not advertise, although the state Bar publicized her e-mail
address.20 The majority indicated that the prospective client’s
[U]nsolicited e-mail is not confidential.
Private
information received from a non-client via an unsolicited
e-mail is not required to be held as confidential by a
lawyer, if the lawyer has not had an opportunity to warn or
stop the flow of non-client information at or before the
communication is delivered.21
The San Diego Bar stated that the lawyer may continue to represent the
other injured accident victim and use the information against the e-mail’s
author.22 The San Diego Bar indicated that it would be a “closer question”
if the lawyer had included her e-mail address at the bottom of an
advertisement without any disclaimers.23 In that situation, there would be
an “inference that private information divulged to the attorney would be
confidential.”24 A dissenting opinion argued: “I would err on the side of
the consumer and find that there is a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality on behalf of the consumer sending an e-mail to an attorney
with the information necessary to seek legal advice.”25

18

Id.
See generally San Diego Cal. Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-1 (2006)
(discussing the duty of confidentiality with unsolicited communications by e-mail).
20
See id.
21
Id.
22
See id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
19
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[17] In 2007, the Massachusetts Bar took a dramatically different
approach.26 In direct contrast to the New York City analysis, the
Massachusetts Bar indicated that a lawyer could control the flow of
information by using a click-through disclaimer.27
[W]hen an e-mail is sent using a link on a law firm’s web
site, the firm has an opportunity to set conditions on the
flow of information. Using readily available technology,
the firm may require a prospective client to review and
‘click’ his assent to terms of use before using an e-mail
link. Such terms of use might include a provision that any
information communicated before the firm agrees to
represent the prospective client will not be treated as
confidential. Or the terms of use could provide that receipt
of information from a prospective client will not prevent
the firm from representing someone else in the matter.28
The Massachusetts Bar explained that depending on the kind of
information conveyed in the unsolicited e-mail, a law firm’s receipt of
confidential information from a law firm client’s adversary might
“materially limit” the law firm’s ability to represent its client, thus
resulting in the law firm’s disqualification.29 The Massachusetts Bar
concluded that “a law firm can avoid disqualification by requiring
prospective clients to affirmatively indicate their consent to appropriate
terms of use before using an e-mail link provided on the firm’s website.”30
[18] Most recently, the Virginia Bar adopted a majority approach,
indicating that lawyers receiving confidential information in unsolicited emails or voicemails from prospective clients do not have a duty to keep
that information confidential.31

26

See generally Mass. Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. 2007-1 (2007) (discussing the
duty owed to former clients).
27
See id.
28
Id.
29
See id.
30
Id. cmt. 1.
31
See Va. Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. 1842 (2008).
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[19] In trying to deal with all of these issues, the ABA added Rule 1.18 of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.32 That rule (“Duties to
Prospective Client”) starts with the bedrock principle that a person will be
considered a “prospective client” if the person discusses with a lawyer
“the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship.”33 The lawyer
must treat such a person as a former client for conflicts purposes.34 A
lawyer in such a situation may not represent the adversary in the same or
substantially related matter—if “the lawyer received information from the
prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the
matter.”35 This would allow the lawyer more flexibility than the standard
rule, which would have prevented the lawyer’s representation of the
adversary if the lawyer had received any pertinent confidential
information from the prospective client and not just information that
“could be significantly harmful” to the prospective client.36
[20] Finally, any individual lawyer’s disqualification even under that
standard is not imputed to the entire law firm if the lawyer had taken
“reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information
than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the
prospective client," and if the individually disqualified lawyer is screened
from the matter (including financially screened) and provides written
notice to the prospective client.37
[21] The second comment of Rule 1.18 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct provides some guidance that could apply to
unsolicited e-mails.
Not all persons who communicate information to a lawyer
are entitled to protection under this Rule. A person who
communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without
any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to
discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer
32

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (2000).
Id. R. 1.18(a).
34
Id. R. 1.18(b); see id. R. 1.9 (2000).
35
Id. R. 1.18(c).
36
Id.
37
Id. R. 1.18(d)(2).
33
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relationship, is not a “prospective client” within the
meaning of paragraph (a).38
As with all ABA Model Rule changes, it will take time to see if states
ultimately follow the same approach.
[22] Ironically, e-mail communications can also make it difficult to
analyze the other end of an attorney-client relationship. Under Rule 1.7 of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers cannot take on
any matter adverse to a current client without that client’s consent.39 In
contrast, Rule 1.9 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
permits lawyers to take on matters adverse to former clients, unless the
client formerly represented a client in the same or substantially related
matter, or otherwise acquired confidences from the client that the lawyer
could now use against him.40 Thus, it can be critically important to know
whether there is a current attorney-client relationship when analyzing
conflicts. Many law firms send various complimentary e-mail “alerts” to
both current clients and former clients. To the extent that lawyers
continue to treat a former client as if he were currently a client (by sending
e-mail alerts or otherwise), those lawyers might find themselves facing the
much more stringent conflicts rules governing adversity to current clients.
B. EX PARTE CONTACTS WITH ADVERSARIES
[23] The ease of e-mail transmissions sometimes implicate Rule 4.2 of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, another basic ethics rule
dealing with lawyers’ communications with represented adversaries.41 As
with the issue of communications from prospective clients, the spread of
e-mail communications has not created a brand-new issue, but made an
existing issue more difficult to tackle.
[24] The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain a fairly
simple prohibition that generates a nearly endless series of issues:

38

Id. R. 1.18(a) cmt. 2.
Id. R. 1.7.
40
Id. R. 1.9.
41
See id. R. 4.2.
39
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In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate
about the subject of the representation with a person the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.42
This prohibition rests on several basic principles:
This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal
system by protecting a person who has chosen to be
represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible
overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the
matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer
relationship and the uncounselled disclosure of information
relating to the representation.43
As one analyzes application of the basic prohibition, it becomes apparent
that the more important principle underlying the rule is the need to avoid
interference between a client’s and lawyer’s relationship. For instance, the
prohibition extends to many types of communications that could not
possibly involve a lawyer’s “overreaching.”44
[25] The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers follows
essentially the same approach, although with a few more variations:
(1) A lawyer representing a client in a matter may
not communicate about the subject of the representation
with a nonclient whom the lawyer knows to be represented
in the matter by another lawyer or with a representative of
an organizational nonclient so represented as defined in §
100, unless:
(a) the communication is with a public
officer or agency to the extent stated in § 101;
(b) the lawyer is a party and represents no
other client in the matter;
42

Id.
Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 1.
44
See id.
43
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(c) the communication is authorized by law;
(d) the communication reasonably responds
to an emergency; or
(e) the other lawyer consents.45
The Restatement recognizes the two same basic principles underlying the
prohibition: “The rules stated in §§ 99-103, protect against overreaching
and deception of nonclients. The rule of [Section 99] also protects the
relationship between the represented nonclient and that person’s lawyer
and assures the confidentiality of the nonclient’s communications with the
lawyer.”46
[26] The language of Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and the Restatement involves several important issues. First,
courts and bars might have to determine whether there is a matter
sufficient to trigger the Rule 4.2 prohibition. For instance, in Alaska
Ethics Opinion 2006-1, on January 27, 2006, the Alaska Bar dealt with
situations in which a lawyer has a consumer complaint about a local
company, disagrees with a local newspaper’s editorial policy, or has
concerns as a homeowner with a municipal government’s decision on a
building permit.47 Among other things, the Alaska Bar discussed whether
any of the scenarios involved a matter in which the store, newspaper, or
government is represented:
In the three examples set forth above, the key
question posed in each instance is whether there is a
“matter” that is “the subject of the representation.” An
initial contact to attempt to obtain information or to resolve
a conflict informally rarely involves a matter that is known
to be the subject of representation. Consequently, lawyers,
representing clients or themselves, ordinarily are free to
contact institutions that regularly retain counsel in an
attempt to obtain information or to resolve a problem
informally. These sorts of contacts frequently resolve a
potential dispute long before it becomes a “matter” that is
45

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99(1) (2000).
Id. § 99 cmt. b (citations omitted).
47
See Alaska Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-1 (2006).
46
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“the subject of representation.” The above examples are all
worded to suggest the inquiry occurs at the early stage of a
consumer or citizen complaint. Inquiries directed to
employees and managers would be proper in each
instance.48
The Alaska Bar concluded that:
The line between permitted contacts at the early
stage of a potential matter and forbidden contacts after a
dispute has sharpened and become a “matter that is the
subject of representation” depends on the question
discussed in the preceding section: Until the lawyer knows
that an opposing counsel has been asked by the party to
deal with the particular new matter, the lawyer is not
prohibited from dealing directly with representatives of the
party.49
[27] Second, courts and bars might have to determine whether a lawyer
engaging in such an ex parte contact is doing so in “representing a
client.”50 In some situations involving ex parte contacts, lawyers are not
acting as client representatives. For instance, Maryland Ethics Opinion
2006-7 states that a lawyer appointed by the court as guardian of the
property of a disabled nursing home resident may communicate directly
with the nursing facility, even though the facility is represented by a
lawyer.51 The Maryland Bar contrasted the role of a guardian with that of
a lawyer:
“A guardian is not an agent of a ward, because guardians
are not subject to the ward’s control; rather, the guardians
serve a unique role as agents of the court. In reality the
court is the guardian; an individual who is given that title is
merely an agent or arm of that tribunal in carrying out its

48

Id.
Id.
50
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2000).
51
See Md. Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-7 (2006).
49
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sacred responsibility. Thus, a ward may not select, instruct,
terminate, or otherwise control his guardian.”
In contrast, an attorney-client relationship is “an
agent-principal relationship.” “A client’s right to select and
direct his or her attorney is a fundamental aspect of
attorney-client relations.
Thus, the principal-agent
relationship between a client and an attorney is always a
consensual one.”
From this explication, it does not
appear that the member appointed by the court as Guardian
“represents” the Resident . . . no attorney-client relationship
exists, only a guardian-ward relationship. Accordingly,
MRPC 4.2 is not applicable to communications between
the Guardian and the Nursing Facility.52
[28] The restriction on ex parte communications to situations in which a
lawyer is “representing a client” also allows clients to seek “second
opinions” from other lawyers—because those other lawyers are not
“representing a client” in that matter:53
A lawyer who does not represent a person in the
matter and who is approached by an already-represented
person seeking a second professional opinion or wishing to
discuss changing lawyers or retaining additional counsel,
may, without consent from or notice to the original lawyer,
respond to the request, including giving an opinion
concerning the propriety of the first lawyer’s
representation.54
[29] Third, similar to other situations involving conflicts of interests,
courts and bars might have to determine whether the other person is

52

Id. (citations omitted).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 4 (2000) (“Nor does this Rule
preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer
who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter.”); see also id. R. 4.2 cmt. 8
(“The prohibition on communication with a represented person only applies in
circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter
to be discussed.”).
54
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99 cmt. c (2000).
53
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“represented by another lawyer.”55 In class action situations, this issue
normally involves a debate about whether the attorney-client relationship
has begun. The Restatement explains the majority position on this issue:
A lawyer who represents a client opposing a class in
a class action is subject to the anticontact rule of this
Section. For the purposes of this Section, according to the
majority of decisions, once the proceeding has been
certified as a class action, the members of the class are
considered clients of the lawyer for the class; prior to
certification, only those class members with whom the
lawyer maintains a personal client-lawyer relationship are
clients. Prior to certification and unless the court orders
otherwise, in the case of competing putative class actions a
lawyer for one set of representatives may contact class
members who are only putatively represented by a
competing lawyer, but not class representatives or members
known to be directly represented in the matter by the other
lawyer.56
An ABA legal ethics opinion has also taken the following approach. In
the class action context, “a client-lawyer relationship with a potential
member of the class does not begin until the class has been certified and
55

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (emphasis added).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99 cmt. l (2000); see
Debra Lyn Bassett, Pre-Certification Communication Ethics in Class Actions, 36 GA. L.
REV. 353, 355-56 (2002) (“The majority view, embraced by most courts, the
Restatement, and the leading class action treatise, holds that before class certification,
putative class members are not ‘represented’ by class counsel.”); Phila. Bar Ass’n on
Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-6 (2006) (stating that a defense lawyer may engage in ex parte
communications with purported class members before a class certification). The
Philadelphia Bar Association also states, “[t]he majority rule in most jurisdictions is that,
after a class action is filed but prior to certification of a class, contact between counsel for
a defendant and members of the putative class is permitted,” citing to the Restatement
that the ex parte contact would be with sophisticated corporations rather than
unsophisticated individuals and that the lawyer must make the recipients of the
communications aware of the pending class action. See Blanchard v. Edgemark Fin.
Corp., No. 94 C 1890, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15420, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1998)
(recognizing that class members are represented “once a class has been certified”)
(quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.2, at 234 (3d ed. 1995)).
56
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the time for opting out by a potential member of the class has expired.”57
Therefore, Rules 4.2 and 7.3 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct “do not generally prohibit counsel for either plaintiff or defendant
from communicating with persons who may in the future become
members of the class.”58 The opinion further determines both lawyers
must comply with Rule 4.3 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct if they communicate with potential class members, and that
plaintiffs’ lawyer must comply with Rule 7.3 if they are soliciting
membership in the class, but those restrictions “do not apply to contacting
potential class members as witnesses.”59 The opinion states “[b]oth
plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel have legitimate need to reach out
to potential class members regarding the facts that are the subject of the
potential class action, including information that may be relevant to
whether or not a class should be certified”60 and that
Restricting defense communication with potential plaintiffs
could inhibit the defendant from taking remedial measures
to alleviate a harmful or dangerous condition that has led to
the lawsuit. A defendant in a class action lawsuit also
would be prevented from attempting to reach conciliation
agreements with members of the potential class without
going through a lawyer whom the potential class member
may have no interest in retaining.61
Of course, however, “the court may assume control over communications
by counsel with class members.”62
[30] In other situations, the debate focuses on whether the attorney-client
relationship has ended. For example, in K-Mart Corp. v. Helton,63 the
Kentucky Supreme Court found that

57

See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-445
(2007).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
894 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1995).
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The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the
continued representation of an individual after the
conclusion of a proceeding is not necessarily presumed and
that the passage of time may be a reasonable ground to
believe that a person is no longer represented by a
particular lawyer. Rule 4.2 is not intended to prohibit all
direct contact in such circumstances. Here counsel for
plaintiffs had reasonable grounds to believe that the
petitioners were not represented by counsel when he took
the Pittman statement. In considering the fact that no
contact was made by an attorney on behalf of K-Mart until
more than one year after the incident which gave rise to this
action and almost one year after plaintiffs’ counsel took the
statement, we believe that the communication with the KMart employee was not with a party the attorney knew was
represented by another attorney in the matter.64
[31] Fourth, courts and bars might have to determine if the lawyer making
ex parte contacts “knows” that the other person is represented by another
lawyer in the matter. Rule 1.0(f) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct defines “knows” as denoting “actual knowledge of the fact in
question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”65
Comment 8 to Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
explains that:
The prohibition on communications with a represented
person only applies in circumstances where the lawyer
knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to
be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual
knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual
knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See
Rule 1.0(f). Thus, the lawyer cannot evade the requirement
of obtaining the consent of counsel by closing eyes to the
obvious.66

64

Id. at 631.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2000).
66
Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 8 (emphasis added).
65
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The ABA has also explained that:
[I]n the Committee’s view, Rule 4.2 does not, like Rule 4.3
[governing a lawyer’s communications with an
unrepresented person], imply a duty to inquire.
Nonetheless, it bears emphasis that, as stated in the
definition of “knows” . . . actual knowledge may be
inferred from the circumstances. It follows, therefore, that
a lawyer may not avoid Rule 4.2’s bar against
communication with a represented person simply by
closing her eyes to the obvious.67
[32] Fifth, courts and bars might have to determine if an ex parte contact
constitutes a “communication” for purposes of Rule 4.2 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. For instance, in Hill v. Shell Oil
Co.,68 plaintiffs filed a class action suit against Shell gas stations, claiming
that they discriminated against African-American customers.69 The
previous six years, plaintiffs arranged for assistants posing as consumers
to interact with Shell gas station employees, videotaping what they alleged
to be racial discrimination.70 When Shell discovered this type of
investigation, it moved for a protective order to prohibit any further such
contacts.71 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois denied the protective order, finding that while the gas station
managers were in the Rule 4.2 “off-limits” category, the contacts between
the investigators and the gas station employees did not constitute
“communications” sufficient to trigger the Rule 4.2 prohibition.72 The
court stated,
Here we have secret videotapes of station
employees reacting (or not reacting) to plaintiffs and other
persons posing as consumers. Most of the interactions that
67

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995) (emphasis
added).
68
209 F. Supp. 2d 876 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
69

Id. at 877.
See id.
71
See id.
72
See id. at 879-80.
70
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occurred in the videotapes do not involve any questioning
of the employees other than asking if a gas pump is prepay
or not, and as far as we can tell these conversations are not
within the audio range of the video camera. These
interactions do not rise to the level of communication
protected by Rule 4.2. To the extent that employees and
plaintiffs have substantive conversations outside of normal
business transactions, we will consider whether to bar that
evidence when and if it is offered at trial.73
[33] Courts take Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct very seriously. For instance, in In re Allan K. Knappenberger,74
two law firm employees filed an employment-related lawsuit against a
lawyer.75 After the lawyer received service of the Summons and
Complaint late on a Friday afternoon, he confronted one of the employees
and “ask[ed], in an angry tone, what it was and whose idea it had been.”76
It was apparently undisputed that “[t]he entire conversation lasted between
30 seconds and one minute.”77 The lawyer spoke the next day to the other
plaintiff who had sued him—in a conversation that lasted between 5 and
20 minutes.78 Both of the plaintiffs reported these contacts to their
lawyers, who amended the complaint, to add a retaliation claim.79 The
Oregon Supreme Court found that the lawyer had violated the ex parte
contact prohibition, and suspended him for 120 days.80 The court noted in
passing, but ultimately found irrelevant, the fact that the lawyer ultimately
won the lawsuit brought by his employees.81
[34] The general rule applies even to lawyers sending copies of pleadings
to represented adversaries:

73

Id. at 880.
108 P.3d 1161 (Or. 2005).
75
Id. at 1163.
76
Id.
77
Id. (emphasis added).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1172.
81
See id. at 1163 (emphasis added).
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Under the anti-contact rule of this Section, a lawyer
ordinarily is not authorized to communicate with a
represented nonclient even by letter with a copy to the
opposite lawyer or even if the opposite lawyer wrongfully
fails to convey important information to that lawyer’s
client, such as a settlement offer.82
[35] Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and every
state’s variation require the consent of the other person’s lawyer. 83 The
other person’s consent does not suffice.84 Comment 3 to Rule 4.2 states,
“The Rule applies even though the represented person initiates or consents
to the communication. A lawyer must immediately terminate
communication with a person if, after commencing communication, the
lawyer learns that the person is one with whom communication is not
permitted by this Rule.”85
[36] The Restatement takes the same approach. Comment B in Section
99 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers states that
the “general exception to the rule . . . requires consent of the opposing
lawyer; consent of the client alone does not suffice.”86 Another comment
states that the “anti-contact rule applies to any communication relating to
the lawyer’s representation in the matter, whoever initiates the contact and
regardless of the content of the ensuing communication.”87 Another
example is a New York City Bar Association legal ethics opinion which
applied the ex parte prohibition even to communications initiated by a
“sophisticated non-lawyer insurance adjuster.”88
[37] Ignoring this rule can cause real damage. In Inorganic Coatings, Inc.
v. Falberg,89 for example, a lawyer for Inorganic Coatings sent a letter to
82

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99 cmt. f (2000)
(citations omitted).
83
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2000).
84
Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 3.
85
Id.
86
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99 cmt. b (2000).
87
Id. § 99 cmt. f.
88
See The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 2005-04 (2005).
89
926 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
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an International Zinc official (Falberg) threatening to sue his company for
certain conduct.90 Inorganic’s lawyer later spoke with International Zinc’s
lawyer about a possible settlement, but the conversation was
unsuccessful.91 Later the same day, the lawyer received a telephone call
from Falberg.92 Inorganic’s lawyer advised Falberg that “it would be
best” if the communication took place between the lawyers, but did not
terminate the conversation.93 The lawyer spoke with Falberg for about
ninety minutes and took twenty-four pages of notes.94 Among other
things, he used the information to revise his draft complaint.95 The court
found that Inorganic’s lawyer had violated the state ethics code prohibition
on such ex parte contacts, and disqualified the lawyer and his firm from
representing Inorganic even though they had been engaged for over one
year in investigating and preparing the lawsuit.96
[38] It may seem counter-intuitive, but a lawyer takes an enormous risk
by accepting at face value even a highly sophisticated person’s assurance
that the person’s lawyer has consented to an ex parte communication.97
Courts and bars have wrestled with a lawyer’s obligations if the person
indicates that she has fired her lawyer. The ABA has stated that a lawyer
may proceed with an ex parte communication with a person only if the
lawyer has “reasonable assurance” that the representation has ended.98 On
the other hand, the Texas Supreme Court has held,
Rule 4.02 does not require an attorney to contact a person’s
former attorney to confirm the person’s statement that
representation has been terminated before communicating
with the person. Confirmation may be necessary in some
90

See id. at 518.
See id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 521.
97
See The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 2005-04 (2005) (“A lawyer who proceeds on the basis of other evidence of
consent, such as the opposing client’s assurance that its counsel has consented, runs the
risk of violating the rule if opposing counsel did not in fact consent.”).
98
See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396
(1995).
91
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circumstances before an attorney can determine whether a
person is no longer represented, but it is not required by
Rule 4.02 in every situation, and for good reason. The
attorney may not be able to provide confirmation if, as in
this case, he and his client have not communicated. And
while a client should certainly be expected to communicate
with his attorney about discontinuing representation, the
client in some circumstances may have reasons for not
doing so immediately.99
E-mail communications implicate all of these traditional ethics issues.
C. INADVERTENT TRANSMISSION OF COMMUNICATIONS
[39] As indicated above, the ease of communicating by e-mail has
affected many legal issues in the context of intentionally transmitted emails. Most importantly, clients’ and lawyers’ intentional widespread
transmission of e-mails implicates attorney-client privilege issues. The
ethics rules primarily deal with the other kind of transmission—the
unintentional (usually called “inadvertent”) transmission of e-mails. This
issue has vexed the ABA, state bars, and state courts for many years.
[40] In the early 1990s, the ABA tended to favor requiring the return of
such documents, but recently, however, the ABA shifted its course. It will
be interesting to see if the ABA’s retreat from its earlier position generates
a similar approach by bars and courts. In 1992, the ABA issued a
surprisingly strong opinion directing lawyers to return obviously
privileged or confidential documents inadvertently sent to them outside
the document production context.100 The ABA indicated that:
[A]s a matter of ethical conduct contemplated by the
precepts underlying the Model Rules, [the lawyer] (a)
should not examine the [privileged] materials once the
inadvertence is discovered, (b) should notify the sending

99

In re Users Sys. Servs., Inc., 22 S.W.3d 331, 334-35 (Tex. 1999).
See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368
(1992).
100
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lawyer of their receipt and (c) should abide by the sending
lawyer’s instructions as to their disposition.101
As explained below, many bars and courts took the ABA’s lead in
imposing some duty on lawyers receiving obviously privileged or
confidential documents to return them forthwith.
[41] The ABA, however, recently retreated from this position. As a result
of the Ethics 2000 Task Force Recommendations, Rule 4.4(b) of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct now indicates that “[a] lawyer who
receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client
and knows or reasonably should know that the document was
inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.” 102
[42] Comment 2 to Rule 4.4(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct reveals that, in its current form, the ABA’s approach is both
broader and narrower than the ABA had earlier announced in its Legal
Ethics Opinions.103 Rule 4.4(b) is broader because it applies to
documents “that were mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or
their lawyers,” thus clearly covering document productions.104 The rule is
narrower than the earlier legal ethics opinion because
If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a
document was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires
the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit
that person to take protective measures. Whether the
lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as returning
the original document, is a matter of law beyond the scope
of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged
status of a document has been waived. Similarly, this Rule
does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a
101

Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2000) (emphasis added); see THOMAS
E. SPAHN, MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N OF AM., LITIG. ETHICS: PART II (DISCOVERY)
HYPOTHETICALS & ANALYSIS 85 (2007),
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Conferences/2007/2007LIRC/LitigationEthicsPart
IIH&A.pdf.
103
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2.
104
Id. (emphasis added).
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document that the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know may have been wrongfully obtained by the sending
person.105
[43] In its new form, the ABA approach defers to case law on the issue of
whether a lawyer must return such documents, but provides a professional
“safe harbor” for those who do:
Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for
example, when the lawyer learns before receiving the
document that it was inadvertently sent to the wrong
address. Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law
to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document
is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to
the lawyer.106
Thus, the ABA backed off its strict return requirement and now defers to
legal principles stated by other bars or courts. As a result of these changes
in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA took the very
unusual step of withdrawing the earlier ABA LEO that created the “return
unread” doctrine.107
[44] The Restatement would allow use of inadvertently transmitted
privileged information under certain circumstances:
If the disclosure operates to end legal protection for the
information, the lawyer may use it for the benefit of the
lawyer’s own client and may be required to do so if that
105

Id.
Id. R. 4.4 cmt. 3.
107
See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437
(2005) (discussing inadvertent disclosure of confidential materials). ABA Model Rule
4.4(b) now governs the conduct of lawyers who receive inadvertently transmitted
privileged communications from a third party. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
4.4(b). Formal Opinion 437 stated that Rule 4.4 “only obligates the receiving lawyer to
notify the sender of the inadvertent transmission promptly. The rule does not require the
receiving lawyer either to refrain from examining the materials or to abide by the
instructions of the sending lawyer.” ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005).
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would advance the client’s lawful objectives. That would
follow, for example, when an opposing lawyer failed to
object to privileged or immune testimony. The same legal
result may follow when divulgence occurs inadvertently
outside of court. The receiving lawyer may be required to
consult with that lawyer’s client about whether to take
advantage of the lapse.
If the person whose information was disclosed is
entitled to have it suppressed or excluded, the receiving
lawyer must either return the information or hold it for
disposition after appropriate notification to the opposing
person or that person’s counsel. A court may suppress
material after an inadvertent disclosure that did not amount
to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
Where deceitful or illegal means were used to
obtain the information, the receiving lawyer and that
lawyer’s client may be liable, among other remedies, for
damages for harm caused or for injunctive relief against use
or disclosure. The receiving lawyer must take steps to
return such confidential client information and to keep it
confidential from the lawyer’s own client in the interim.
Similarly, if the receiving lawyer is aware that
disclosure is being made in breach of trust by a lawyer or
other agent of the opposing person, the receiving lawyer
must not accept the information. An offending lawyer may
be disqualified from further representation in a matter to
which the information is relevant if the lawyer’s own client
would otherwise gain a substantial advantage. A tribunal
may also order suppression or exclusion of such
information.108
[45] State bars have provided varying ethics guidance to lawyers who
receive inadvertently sent privileged documents outside the document
production context. State bars have directed that lawyers: should return
the documents if the lawyer received them “under circumstances in which
it is clear that they were not intended for the receiving lawyer,” but should
108

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. m (2000)
(citations omitted).
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not be disciplined for attempting to use the documents under a good faith
argument that the protections had been waived.109 State bars have stated
that lawyers should return the documents before reviewing them if the
lawyer receives notice of their inadvertent transmission, but feel free to
use the inadvertently sent documents if the lawyer reviews them without
notice of the inadvertent transmission by the sending lawyer.110 State bars
have also affirmed that lawyers should feel free to retain the inadvertently
sent documents, but notify the sending lawyer (and send a copy of the
documents back to the sending lawyer “to ensure that there is no
misunderstanding about the document in issue.”)111
[46] Court decisions have also reached differing conclusions. Some
courts have allowed lawyers to take advantage of their adversary’s mistake
in transmitting privileged or confidential documents.112 The courts
normally do not ever mention the ethics issues, but instead focus on the
waiver issues.113 Other decisions indicate that lawyers who fail to notify
the adversary or return inadvertently transmitted privileged documents risk
109

Ky. Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. KBA E-374 (1995),
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics_opinions/kba_e-374.pdf.
110
See Ill. State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 98-04 (1999);
see also Va. Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. 1702 (1997) (discussing confidentiality
duties when a lawyer inadvertently receives confidential information without notice).
The Illinois State Bar Association opinion adopts the reasoning of ABA Formal Op. 368
(1992) in concluding that a lawyer receiving “inadvertently transmitted confidential
documents from opposing counsel or opposing counsel’s client” should return the
documents although prohibiting a lawyer from reading an inadvertently transmitted
document based on “boilerplate” notices on fax cover pages would “violate reality.” Ill.
State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct, Adv. Op 98-04 (1999). Once the
lawyer recognizes a document as confidential, the lawyer “has an ethical duty to notify
opposing counsel, to honor opposing counsel’s instructions about disposition of the
document, and not to use the document in contravention of opposing counsel’s
instructions.” Id.
111
See Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Comm. on the Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 146
(1994), withdrawn and rev’d Advisory Op. 172 (2000).
112
See, e.g., FDIC v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992) (“[A]lthough Plaintiff
produced the memorandum inadvertently, it waived its privilege in the document when
opposing counsel reviewed it.”); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(“The courts will grant no greater protection to those who assert the privilege than their
own precautions warrant.”).
113
See FDIC, 140 F.R.D. at 253 (“The purpose of the privilege is to protect the
confidences of clients . . . [h]owever, when a document is disclosed, even inadvertently, it
is no longer held in confidence despite the intentions of the party . . . .”).
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disqualification or sanctions.114 The California Supreme Court recently
disqualified a lawyer for reading and relying upon a privileged document
that the lawyer claims to have inadvertently received from a court reporter
(although the facts of the case seem to indicate that the lawyer
surreptitiously purloined the document from the opposing lawyer’s
briefcase).115
[47] One might have expected the ethics rules to take a more forgiving
approach to the increasingly common unintentional transmission of
communications occurring in the era of e-mail. The ABA, in taking the
opposite approach, highlights its emphasis on lawyers’ roles as client
114

See generally Am. Express v. Accu-Weather, Inc., No. 91 CIV. 6485 (RWS), 92 CIV.
705 (RWS), 1996 WL 346388 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1996) (imposing sanctions on a lawyer
for what the court considered the unethical act of opening a Federal Express package and
reviewing a privileged document after receiving a telephone call from opposing counsel
informing them of the inadvertent production); Conley, Lott, Nichols Mach. Co. v.
Brooks, 948 S.W.2d 345, 349 (Tex. App. 1997) (stating that although a lawyer’s failure
to return a purloined privileged document would not automatically result in
disqualification, “what he did after he obtained the documents must also be considered”
and disqualifying the lawyer in this case because his retention and use of the knowingly
privileged documents amounted to “conduct [that] fell short of the standard that an
attorney who receives unsolicited confidential information must follow.”), rev’d sub nom.
In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. 1998) (holding that it is difficult to assign a bright
line standard for disqualification where an attorney, through no wrongdoing, receives an
opponent’s privileged material).
115
See Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 171 P.3d 1092, 1094 (Cal. 2007). In Rico, the
plaintiff’s lawyer came into possession of the defendant’s counsel’s personal notes of a
previous session with defendant’s expert. Id. at 1095. Plaintiff’s counsel made copies
for other counsel and for plaintiff’s experts to study. Id. at 1100. The notes were then
used by the plaintiff’s counsel to impeach the defendant’s expert during a deposition. Id.
at 1095. The Supreme Court of California upheld the trial court’s determination that the
notes were “absolutely privileged by the work product rule.” Id. at 1096, because they
amounted to “an attorney’s written notes about a witness’s statements.” Id. at 1096-97.
The court explained that, “[w]hen a witness’s statement and the attorney’s impressions
are inextricably intertwined, the work product doctrine provides that absolute protection
is afforded to all of the attorney’s notes.” Id. at 1097. The court adopted the rule that an
attorney should refrain from unnecessary examination and notify the sender “where it is
reasonably apparent that the materials were provided or made available through
inadvertence.” Id. at 1099. The California court rejected the defendant’s argument that
use was justified because the plaintiff’s expert was lying. Id. at 1100. The court
explained that “once the court determines that the writing is absolutely privileged, the
inquiry ends. Courts do not make exceptions based on the content of the writing.” Id. at
1100-01.
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advocates, and—perhaps more importantly—the recognition that the effect
of such inadvertent transmissions should play out in the court-supervised
world of privilege rather than in the disciplinary world of ethics.
D. METADATA
[48] Perhaps the most fascinating new ethics issue (of any variety)
involves the bars’ attitude toward “metadata”—the invisible “data about
data” that often accompanies an electronic document transmission sent via
e-mail.116 Such metadata can include valuable information about a
document’s authors, dates of creation, earlier drafts, changes, etc.117
Transactional lawyers would love to know of an adversary’s evolving
thoughts about price, purchase terms, etc. that might be reflected in earlier
versions of the adversary’s deal documents. A litigator could gain a
significant advantage by learning their adversary’s now-discarded
arguments in briefs, initial factual statements contained in earlier versions
of interrogatory answers, etc.
[49] This inherently interesting issue has played out in an equally
fascinating display of various states’ differing approaches to receiving
lawyers’ ethical responsibilities. Anyone looking for the best current
paradigm of ethics rules should focus on metadata. If ethics rules
represented some timeless moral principles, one would expect state bars to
take essentially the same approach. After all, every state bar’s ethics
committee consists of experienced, intelligent, professional, and ethically
aware bar leaders.118 Yet the evolution of state bars’ approach to metadata
shows the true nature of ethics rules—which simply try to balance
lawyers’ duties to their clients and lawyers’ possible duties to others in the
legal system.
[50] As so frequently occurs, New York State was the first state bar to
deal with metadata. In 2001, the New York State Bar held that the general
ethics prohibition on deceptive conduct prohibits New York lawyers from
“get[ting] behind” electronic documents sent by adversaries who failed to
116

See W. Lawrence Wescott, The Increasing Importance of Metadata in Electronic
Discovery, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶ 1 (2008).
117
See id. ¶ 3.
118
See, e.g., Virginia Legal Foundation: Committee on Continuing Legal Education,
http://www.vacle.org/clecomm.htm.
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disable the “tracking” software.119 Interestingly, the New York State Bar
issued legal ethics opinion 782 three years later, indicating that lawyers
have an ethical duty to “use reasonable care when transmitting documents
by e-mail to prevent the disclosure of metadata containing client
confidences or secrets.”120
[51] The Florida Bar followed the New York approach—warning lawyers
to be careful when they send metadata, but prohibiting the receiving
lawyer from examining the metadata.121 Lawyers must take “reasonable
steps” to protect the confidentiality of any information they transmit,
including metadata.122
It is the recipient lawyer’s concomitant obligation, upon
receiving an electronic communication or document from
another lawyer, not to try to obtain from metadata
information relating to the representation of the sender’s
client that the recipient knows or should know is not
intended for the recipient. Any such metadata is to be
considered by the receiving lawyer as confidential
information which the sending lawyer did not intend to
transmit.123
[52] These positions, however, are not reconcilable with Florida Rule 44.4(b), which requires the receiving lawyer to “promptly notify the
sender” if the receiving lawyer “inadvertently obtains information from
metadata that the recipient knows or should know was not intended for the
recipient [lawyer]” but does not prevent the recipient from reading or
relying upon the inadvertently transmitted communication.124 The Florida
opinion explicitly avoids addressing metadata “in the context of
documents that are subject to discovery under applicable rules of court or
law.”125
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N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 749 (2001).
N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 782 (2004).
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[53] In 2006, the ABA took exactly the opposite position—holding that
the receiving lawyer may freely examine metadata.126 As long as the
receiving lawyer did not obtain an electronic document in an improper
manner, the lawyer may ethically examine the document’s metadata,
including even using “more thorough or extraordinary investigative
measures” that “might permit the retrieval of embedded information that
the provider of electronic documents either did not know existed, or
thought was deleted.”127 The opinion does not analyze whether the
transmission of such metadata is “inadvertent,” but at most such an
inadvertent transmission would require the receiving lawyer to notify the
sending lawyer of the metadata’s receipt.128 Lawyers “sending or
producing” electronic documents can take steps to avoid transmitting
metadata through new means such as scrubbing software, or more
traditional means such as faxing the document.129 Lawyers can also
negotiate confidentiality agreements or protective orders allowing the
“client to ‘pull back,’ or prevent the introduction of evidence based upon,
the document that contains that embedded information or the information
itself.”130
[54] Maryland then followed this ABA approach.131 Absent some
agreement with the receiving lawyer, the sending lawyer “has an ethical
obligation to take reasonable measures to avoid the disclosure of
confidential or work product materials imbedded in the electronic
discovery,” although not every inadvertent disclosure constitutes an ethics
violation.132 There is no ethical violation if a lawyer or the lawyer’s
assistant “reviews or makes use of the metadata [received from another
person] without first ascertaining whether the sender intended to include
such metadata.”133 The opinion points to the absence in the Maryland
Rules of any provision requiring the recipient of inadvertently transmitted

126

ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442
(2006).
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Id.
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Id.
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See id.
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Id.
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Md. State Bar Comm. on Ethics, Formal Op. 2007-09 (2007).
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Id.
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privileged material to notify the sender.134 A receiving lawyer “can, and
probably should, communicate with his or her client concerning the pros
and cons of whether to notify the sending attorney and/or to take such
other action which they believe is appropriate.”135 The opinion notes that
the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will
supersede the Maryland ethics provisions at least in federal litigation, and
that violating that new provision would likely constitute a violation of
Rule 8.4(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as being
“prejudicial to the administration of justice.”136
[55] In early 2007, the Alabama Bar lined up with the bars prohibiting the
mining of metadata.137 In Ethics Opinion 2007-02, the Alabama Bar first
indicated that “an attorney has an ethical duty to exercise reasonable care
when transmitting electronic documents to ensure that he or she does not
disclose his or her client’s secrets and confidences.”138 The Alabama Bar
then dealt with the ethical duties of a lawyer receiving an electronic
document from another person; the Bar only cited New York Ethics
Opinion 749, and did not discuss ABA Ethics Opinion 06-442.139 Citing
Alabama Rule 8.4 (which is the same as Rule 8.4 of the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct), the Alabama Bar concluded that “[t]he mining
of metadata constitutes a knowing and deliberate attempt by the recipient
attorney to acquire confidential and privileged information in order to
obtain an unfair advantage against an opposing party.”140
[56] The Alabama Bar did not address Alabama’s approach to
inadvertently transmitted communications (Alabama does not have a
corollary to Rule 4.4(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct).141 The Alabama Bar acknowledged that “one possible
exception” to the prohibition on mining metadata involves electronic
134

See id.
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See id.
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Ala. State Bar Gen. Counsel, Formal Op. 2007-02 (2007).
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See id.; ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06442 (2006); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 749 (2001).
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Ala. Bar Gen. Counsel, Formal Op. 2007-02 (2007); see MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2000).
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See Ala. Bar Gen. Counsel, Formal Op. 2007-02.
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discovery, because “metadata evidence may be relevant and material to
the issues at hand” in litigation.142
[57] The D.C. Bar dealt with the metadata issue in late 2007.143 The D.C.
Bar generally agreed with the New York and Alabama approach, but noted
that as of February 1, 2007, D.C. Rule 4.4(b) is “more expansive than the
ABA version,” because it prohibits the lawyer from examining an
inadvertently transmitted writing if the lawyer “knows, before examining
the writing, that it has been inadvertently sent.”144 The D.C. Bar held that
A receiving lawyer is prohibited from reviewing metadata
sent by an adversary only where he has actual knowledge
that the metadata was inadvertently sent. In such instances,
the receiving lawyer should not review the metadata before
consulting with the sending lawyer to determine whether
the metadata includes work product of the sending lawyer
or confidences or secrets of the sending lawyer’s client.145
[58] After having explicitly selected the “actual knowledge” standard, the
D.C. Bar then proceeded to abandon it. First, the D.C. Bar indicated that
lawyers could not use “a system to mine all incoming electronic
documents in the hope of uncovering a confidence or secret, the disclosure
of which was unintended by some hapless sender.”146 The Bar warned
that “a lawyer engaging in such a practice with such intent cannot escape
accountability solely because he lacks ‘actual knowledge’ in an individual
case.”147
[59] Second, in discussing the “actual knowledge” requirement, the D.C.
Bar noted the obvious example of the sending lawyer advising the
receiving lawyer of the inadvertence “before the receiving lawyer reviews
the document.”148 The D.C. Bar, however, then gave another example that
appears much closer to a negligence standard:
142

Id.
Legal Ethics Comm. of the D.C. Bar, Formal Op. 341 (2007).
144
Id.
145
Id. (emphasis added).
146
Id. at n.3.
147
Id.
148
Id.
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Such actual knowledge may also exist where a receiving
lawyer immediately notices upon review of the metadata
that it is clear that protected information was
unintentionally included.
These situations will be
fact-dependent, but can arise, for example, where the
metadata includes a candid exchange between an adverse
party and his lawyer such that it is “readily apparent on its
face,” that it was not intended to be disclosed.149
The D.C. Bar indicated that “a prudent receiving lawyer” should contact
the sending lawyer in such a circumstance150—although the effect of the
D.C. Ethics Opinion 341 is to allow ethics sanctions against an imprudent
lawyer.151
[60] Third, the D.C. Bar also abandoned the “actual knowledge”
requirement by using a “patently clear” standard.152 The D.C. Bar
analogized inadvertently transmitted metadata to a situation in which a
lawyer “inadvertently leaves his briefcase in opposing counsel’s office
following a meeting or a deposition.”153
The one lawyer’s negligence in leaving the briefcase does
not relieve the other lawyer from the duty to refrain from
going through that briefcase, at least when it is patently
clear from the circumstances that the lawyer was not
invited to do so.154
[61] After describing situations in which the receiving lawyer cannot
review metadata, the Bar emphasized that even a lawyer who is free to
examine the metadata is not obligated to do so:
Whether as a matter of courtesy, reciprocity, or efficiency,
“a lawyer may decline to retain or use documents that the
149

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
151
See generally id. (discussing the parameters of a lawyer’s duty).
152
Id. at nn.3-4.
153
Id.
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Id.
150
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lawyer might otherwise be entitled to use, although
(depending on the significance of the documents) this
might be a matter on which consultation with the client
may be necessary.”155
[62] Unlike some of the other bars which have dealt with metadata, the
D.C. Bar also explicitly addressed metadata included in responsive
documents being produced in litigation.156 Interestingly, the D.C. Bar
noted that other rules might prohibit the removal of metadata during the
production of electronic documents during discovery.157 Thus,
In view of the obligations of a sending lawyer in providing
electronic documents in response to a discovery request or
subpoena, a receiving lawyer is generally justified in
assuming that metadata was provided intentionally.158
Even in the discovery context, however, a receiving lawyer must comply
with D.C. Rule 4.4(b) if she has “actual knowledge” that metadata
containing protected information has been inadvertently included in the
production.159
[63] In Ethics Opinion 07-03, the Arizona Bar first indicated that lawyers
transmitting electronic documents had a duty to take “reasonable
precautions” to prevent the disclosure of confidential information.160 The
Arizona Bar nevertheless agreed with those states prohibiting the
receiving lawyer from mining metadata—noting that Arizona’s Ethical
Rule 4.4(b) requires a lawyer receiving an inadvertently sent document to
“promptly notify the sender and preserve the status quo for a reasonable
period of time in order to permit the sender to take protective
measures.”161 The Arizona Bar acknowledged that the sending lawyer
might not have inadvertently sent the document, but explained that the
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Id.
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Id.
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Ariz. Bar Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 07-03 (2007).
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lawyer did not intend to transmit metadata—thus triggering Rule 4.4(b).162
The Arizona Bar specifically rejected the ABA approach, because sending
lawyers worried about receiving lawyers reading their metadata “might
conclude that the only ethically safe course of action is to forego the use of
electronic document transmission entirely.”163
[64] In Ethics Opinion 2007-500, the Pennsylvania Bar promised that its
opinion “provides ethical guidance to lawyers on the subject of metadata
received from opposing counsel in electronic materials,”164 but then offers
a completely useless standard:
[I]t is the opinion of this Committee that each attorney
must, as the Preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct
states, “resolve [the issue] through the exercise of sensitive
and moral judgment guided by the basic principles of the
Rules” and determine for himself or herself whether to
utilize the metadata contained in documents and other
electronic files based upon the lawyer’s judgment and the
particular factual situation.165
The Pennsylvania Bar’s conclusion is equally useless.
Therefore, this Committee concludes that, under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, each attorney
must determine for himself or herself whether to utilize the
metadata contained in documents and other electronic files
based upon the lawyer’s judgment and the particular factual
situation. This determination should be based upon the
nature of the information received, how and from whom the
information was received, attorney-client privilege and
work product rules, and common sense, reciprocity and
professional courtesy.166
162

See id.
Id.
164
Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2007-500
(2007).
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Id. (alteration in original).
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[65] The next legal ethics opinion on this issue came from the New York
County Lawyers’ Association Committee on Professional Ethics.167 In
Ethics Opinion 738 (2008), the Committee specifically rejected the ABA
approach, and found that mining an adversary’s electronic documents for
metadata amounts to unethical conduct that “is deceitful and prejudicial to
the administration of justice.”168
[66] Relying on a unique Colorado rule, the Colorado Bar then explained
that a receiving lawyer may freely examine any metadata unless the
lawyer received an actual notice from the sending lawyer that the metadata
was inadvertently included in the transmitted document.169 In addition,
the Colorado Bar explicitly rejected the conclusion reached by
jurisdictions prohibiting receiving lawyers from examining metadata.170
For instance, the Colorado Bar explained that “there is nothing inherently
deceitful or surreptitious about searching for metadata.”171 The Colorado
Bar also concluded that “an absolute ethical bar on even reviewing
metadata ignores the fact that, in many circumstances, metadata do not
contain Confidential Information.”172
[67] The most recent state to have voted on metadata is Maine. In Ethics
Opinion 196 (2008), the Maine Bar reviewed most of the other opinions
on metadata, and ultimately concluded that
[A]n attorney may not ethically take steps to uncover
metadata, embedded in an electronic document sent by
counsel for another party, in an effort to detect information
that is legally confidential and is or should be reasonably
known not to have been intentionally communicated.173
The Maine Bar explained that
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N.Y. County Lawyers Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 738 (2008).
Id.
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Ethics Comm. of the Colo. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 119 (2008).
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Id.
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Id.
172
Id.
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Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm. of the Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 196 (2008).
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Not only is the attorney’s conduct dishonest in purposefully
seeking by this method to uncover confidential information
of another party, that conduct strikes at the foundational
principles that protect attorney-client confidences, and in
doing so it clearly prejudices the administration of
justice.174
Not surprisingly, the Maine Bar also stated that
[T]he sending attorney has an ethical duty to use reasonable
care when transmitting an electronic document to prevent
the disclosure of metadata containing confidential
information. Undertaking this duty requires the attorney to
reasonably apply a basic understanding of the existence of
metadata embedded in electronic documents, the features of
the software used by the attorney to generate the document
and practical measures that may be taken to purge
documents of sensitive metadata where appropriate to
prevent the disclosure of confidential information.175
[68] So the box score on metadata represents a nearly even split. Some
states allow receiving lawyers to check for metadata that their adversaries
might have included along with an electronic document, while an almost
even number of states find such conduct flatly unethical. It will be
interesting to see whether any consensus ever develops.
II. COMMUNICATIONS WITH NON-CLIENTS
[69] Although perhaps not as interesting as the ethics issues implicated
when lawyers communicate by e-mail with adversaries, the ethics rules
have also had to address lawyers’ electronic communications with nonadversarial third parties. These issues arise in a number of settings.

174
175

Id.
Id.
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A. WORKING WITH SERVICE PROVIDERS
[70] To comply with their broad duty of confidentiality, lawyers must
take all reasonable steps to assure that anyone with whom they are
working also protects client confidences.176 For instance, the ABA has
indicated that a lawyer who allows a computer maintenance company
access to the law firm’s files must “ensure that the company has in place,
or will establish, reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality” of
the information in the files.177 The ABA also indicated that the lawyer
would be “well-advised to secure” the computer maintenance company’s
written “assurance of confidentiality.”178
[71] In its recent decision generally approving outsourcing of legal
services, the ABA reminded lawyers that they should consider conducting
due diligence of the foreign legal providers—such as “investigating the
security of the provider’s premises, computer network, and perhaps even
its recycling and refuse disposal procedures.”179
[72] Lawyers must be very careful even when dealing with service
providers such as copy services. In Universal City Development Partners,
Ltd. v. Ride & Show Engineering, Inc.,180 the defendant, Ride & Show
Engineering (RSE), had filed motions seeking the return of documents that
it asserted had been inadvertently produced during discovery.181 The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida highlighted
RSE’s lawyer’s “most serious failure to protect the privilege [which arose
from the litigant’s] knowing and voluntary release of privileged
documents to a third party -- the copying service -- with whom it had no
confidentiality agreement.”182 Taking these observations in combination
176

ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-398
(1995).
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451
(2008).
180
230 F.R.D. 688 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
181
See id. at 698.
182
Id. The court continued by observing that “[h]aving taken the time to review the
documents and tab them for privilege, RSE’s counsel should have simply pulled the
documents out before turning them over to the copying service.” Id. The court further
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with the rest of its analysis, the court refused to order the adversary to
return the inadvertently produced documents.183
B. DONATING ELECTRONIC FILES TO INSTITUTIONS
[73] In a context that interests historians as much as practicing lawyers,
bars have also had to deal with a lawyer’s ability to share client
confidences with institutions which might make them available to later
historians. This issue has always existed, but as in so many other areas,
historical trends have exacerbated the dilemma. Not only have lawyers
played an increasing role in making history (thus, attracting historians’
interest in their communications), but those lawyers increasingly
communicate by e-mail.
[74] The ethical duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege
last forever.184 A number of state legal ethics opinions have explained that
lawyers may not—without consent following full disclosure of every
client affected—donate their files to research libraries or other third
parties.185 Unfortunately, there is no exception for papers even of
historical significance.
C. DISCARDING ELECTRONIC FILES
[75] The increasing use of electronic communications has highlighted
another ethics issue that has always existed—the care with which lawyers
must discard obsolete and unwanted communications with their clients.
Lawyers throwing out their trash have always had to deal with this issue,
opined that “RSE also failed to protect its privilege by promptly reviewing the work
performed by the outside copying service.” Id.
183
Id.
184
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18 (2000) (“The duty of
confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.”); see also
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (holding that the attorney-client
privilege survived the client’s suicide).
185
See, e.g., Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1664 (1995) (stating that a lawyer
may not provide a former client’s historically significant files to a university without
either obtaining the client’s consent or determining that the files contain no confidences
or secrets); Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 928 (1987) (stating that the ethical
duty of confidentiality continues after a client’s death, and the lawyer may not turn over
the client’s files to an institution).

39

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 4

but now must remember the surprising permanence of the electronic
impulses that comprise electronic communications. The sloppy handling
of client confidences can violate a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, and
also result in waiver of the attorney-client privilege.186 In its recent
decisions generally approving outsourcing of legal services, the ABA
reminded lawyers that they should consider conducting due diligence of
the foreign legal providers—such as “investigating the security of the
provider’s premises, computer network, and perhaps even its recycling
and refuse disposal procedures.”187
[76] The most frightening form of inadvertent express waiver is
exemplified by Suburban Sew ’N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc.188
In Suburban, the plaintiff sifted through the defendant’s trash dumpster for
two years.189 This unpleasant task yielded hundreds of discarded
documents, several privileged.190 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois held that the defendants had not taken
reasonable steps to ensure complete obliteration of the documents (such as
shredding) and, therefore, had expressly waived the privilege.191 Under
this approach, the negligent discarding of documents, not just the
negligent handling of documents or the negligent production of documents
to an opponent, can amount to a waiver.192
[77] Other courts take a more forgiving approach, and find that clients do
not waive the attorney-client privilege if they take reasonable steps when
discarding their privileged documents.193 Lawyers attempting to discard
186

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2000); id. R. 1.16(a).
ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451
(2008).
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91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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Id. at 255-56.
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Id. at 256.
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See id. at 260-61.
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See id. at 257-58, 260-61.
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See Sparshott v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., No. 99-0551 (JR), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13800, at
*2-3 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2000) (finding that a discharged employee had not waived the
attorney-client privilege covering a dictaphone tape recording of conversations with his
lawyer by failing to take the tape from his office after he was fired); McCafferty’s, Inc. v.
Bank of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 169-70 (D. Md. 1998) (finding that client had not
waived the attorney-client privilege by discarding a privileged document by tearing it into
smaller pieces and throwing it in the trash).
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repositories of electronic communications (such as computer hard drives)
must remember both their ethical duty of confidentiality and the risks to
the attorney-client privilege.
III. LITIGATION ISSUES
A. OUTSOURCING OF DISCOVERY WORK
[78] The advent of e-mails and other forms of electronic communications
have affected how and from where lawyers and their assistants can
perform legal services. This new form of providing legal services
implicates everything from multi-jurisdictional practice (because lawyers
in one state can virtually “practice law” in another state using electronic
communications) to the hotly discussed method of outsourcing legal work
overseas.194 Lawyers analyzing these issues must protect their clients
from real risks,195 while avoiding the sort of “guild mentality” that will
prevent the lawyer from exploring all of the options that might save the
client money.196
[79] The ABA and state bars are still wrestling with the ethics
implications of foreign outsourcing.197 The ABA has explicitly explained
that lawyers may hire “contract” lawyers to assist in projects—although
the ABA focused on billing questions.198 State bars have also dealt with
194

See, e.g., Cassie B. Hanson, Time for a Virtual Revolution, MINNESOTA LAWYER,
Nov. 3, 2008, available at http:/www.mncourts.gov/lprb/fc08/fc110308.html.
195
See, e.g., Posting of Avoiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law in Other Jurisdictions
When Practicing Law Online to http://kimbrolaw.blogspot.com/2008/06/avoidingunauthorized-practice-of-law.html (June 9, 2008, 22:50:00 EST).
196
See, e.g., https://www.kimbrolaw.com/about.phtml.
197
See Lisa R. Bliss, ABA Ethics Opinion Guides Lawyers in Outsourcing, LITIGATION
NEWS, Nov. 5, 2008, available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/article_ethics.html.
198
ABA Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 420 (2000). A law firm
hiring a contract lawyer may either bill his or her time as: (1) fees, in which case the
client would have a “reasonable expectation” that the contract lawyer has been
supervised, and the law firm can add a surcharge without disclosure to the client,
although some state bars and courts require disclosure of both the hiring and the
surcharge, or (2) costs, in which case the law firm can only bill the actual cost incurred
“plus those costs that are associated directly with the provision of services.” Id. The
ABA states that temporary lawyers must comply with all ethics rules arising from a
lawyer’s representation of a client, but depending on the facts, such as whether the
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ethics issues implicated by lawyers employing “temps” and “independent
contractor” lawyers. 199 Law firms hiring such lawyers and those lawyers
themselves must also follow the unauthorized practice of law rules of the
jurisdiction in which they will be practicing.200
[80] These opinions previewed the more recent issue involving law firms
relying on distant assistance in serving their clients. In recent years, the
New York City Bar,201 the San Diego Bar,202 the Florida Bar203 and the
temporary lawyer “has access to information relating to the representation of firm clients
other than the clients on whose matters the lawyer is working” may not be considered
“associated” with law firms for purposes of the imputed disqualification rules (the firm
should screen such temporary lawyers from other representations). ABA Standing
Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356 (1988). Further, lawyers hiring
temporary lawyers to perform “independent work for a client without the close
supervision of a lawyer associated with the law firm” must obtain the client’s consent
after full disclosure. Id. Additionally, lawyers need not obtain the client’s consent to
having temporary lawyers working on the client matters if the temporary lawyers are
“working under the direct supervision of a lawyer associated with the firm.” Id.
Lawyers need not advise clients of the compensation arrangement for temporary lawyers
“assuming that a law firm simply pays the temporary lawyer reasonable compensation for
the services performed for the firm and does not charge the payments thereafter to the
client as a disbursement.” Id.
199
Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 1712 (1998).
200
See, e.g., D.C. Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law, Op. 16-05 (2005) (noting
that contract lawyers who are performing the work of lawyers rather than paralegals or
law clerks must join the D.C. Bar if they work in D.C. or “regularly” take “short-term
assignments” in D.C.).
201
The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal
Op. 2006-3 (2006). The New York City bar assessed the ethics ramifications of New
York lawyers outsourcing legal support services overseas. Id. It distinguished between
the outsourcing of “substantive legal support services” and “administrative legal support
services” such as transcriptions, accounting services, clerical support, data entry, etc. Id.
It held that New York lawyers may ethically outsource such substantive services if they:
(1) avoid aiding non-lawyers in the unauthorized practice of law, which requires that the
lawyer “must at every step shoulder complete responsibility for the non-lawyer’s work.
In short, the lawyer must, by applying professional skill and judgment, first set the
appropriate scope for the non-lawyer’s work and then vet the non-lawyer’s work and
ensure its quality;” (2) adequately supervise the overseas workers, which requires that the
New York lawyer must be both vigilant and creative in discharging the
duty to supervise. Although each situation is different, among the
salutary steps in discharging the duty to supervise that the New York
lawyer should consider are to (a) obtain background information about
any intermediary employing or engaging the non-lawyer, and obtain the
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professional résumé of the non-lawyer; (b) conduct reference checks;
(c) interview the non-lawyer in advance, for example, by telephone or
by voice-over-internet protocol or by web cast, to ascertain the
particular non-lawyer’s suitability for the particular assignment; and (d)
communicate with the non-lawyer during the assignment to ensure that
the non-lawyer understands the assignment and that the non-lawyer is
discharging the assignment according to the lawyer’s expectations;
(3) preserve the client’s confidences, suggesting “[m]easures that New York lawyers may
take to help preserve client confidences and secrets when outsourcing overseas include
restricting access to confidences and secrets, contractual provisions addressing
confidentiality and remedies in the event of breach, and periodic reminders regarding
confidentiality;” (4) avoid conflicts of interest, advising that
As a threshold matter, the outsourcing New York lawyer should ask the
intermediary, which employs or engages the overseas non-lawyer,
about its conflict-checking procedures and about how it tracks work
performed for other clients. The outsourcing New York lawyer should
also ordinarily ask both the intermediary and the non-lawyer
performing the legal support service whether either is performing, or
has performed, services for any parties adverse to the lawyer’s client.
The outsourcing New York lawyer should pursue further inquiry as
required, while also reminding both the intermediary and the
non-lawyer, preferably in writing, of the need for them to safeguard the
confidences and secrets of their other current and former clients;
(5) bill appropriately, noting that
By definition, the non-lawyer performing legal support services
overseas is not performing legal services. It is thus inappropriate for
the New York lawyer to include the cost of outsourcing in his or her
legal fees. Absent a specific agreement with the client to the contrary,
the lawyer should charge the client no more than the direct cost
associated with outsourcing, plus a reasonable allocation of overhead
expenses directly associated with providing that service;
(6) obtain the client’s consent when necessary, as
[T]here is little purpose in requiring a lawyer to reflexively inform a
client every time that the lawyer intends to outsource legal support
services overseas to a non-lawyer. But the presence of one or more
additional considerations may alter the analysis: for example, if
(a) non-lawyers will play a significant role in the matter, e.g., several
non-lawyers are being hired to do an important document review;
(b) client confidences and secrets must be shared with the non-lawyer,
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North Carolina Bar204 have all approved foreign outsourcing of legal
services. The ABA joined this chorus in July 2008.205
[81] Although there are some variations among these bars’ analyses
regarding the outsourcing of discovery work, all of them take the same
basic approach. To begin, lawyers must avoid aiding non-lawyers in the
unauthorized practice of law.206 Doing so requires lawyers to take
responsibility for all of the outsourced work, ultimately adopting the
outsourced work as their own.207 Additionally, lawyers must provide
in which case informed advance consent should be secured from the
client; (c) the client expects that only personnel employed by the law
firm will handle the matter; or (d) non-lawyers are to be billed to the
client on a basis other than cost, in which case the client’s informed
advance consent is needed.
Id. (citations omitted).
See generally San Diego County Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2007-1 (2007)
(assessing a situation in which a lawyer in a two-lawyer firm was retained to defend a
“complex intellectual property dispute” although he was not experienced in intellectual
property litigation in which the attorney outsourced to an Indian firm).
203
See generally Prof’l Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Op. 07-2 (2008):
202

[L]awyer should be mindful of any obligations under law regarding
disclosure of sensitive information of opposing parties and third parties
. . . [t]he committee believes that the law firm should obtain prior client
consent to disclose information that the firm reasonably believes is
necessary to serve the client’s interests. . . In determining whether a
client should be informed of the participation of the overseas provider
an attorney should bear in mind factors such as whether a client would
reasonably expect the lawyer or law firm to personally handle the
matter and whether the non-lawyers will have more than a limited role
in the provision of the services . . . [t]he law firm may charge a client
the actual cost of the overseas provider, unless the charge would
normally be covered as overhead.
Id.
204

See generally N.C. State Bar Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op.
2007-12 (2008) (analogizing foreign outsourcing and lawyers’ reliance on the services of
“any nonlawyer assistant.”).
205
See generally ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op.
08-451 (2008) (approving the use of outsourcing of legal services).
206
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2000).
207
See id. R. 5.3.
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some degree of supervision, however, the exact nature and degree of the
supervision is far from clear.208 They should consider such steps while
researching the entity that will conduct the outsourced work, conducting
reference checks, interviewing the individuals who will handle the
outsourced work, describing the specific work that the lawyers will
require, and reviewing final product before adopting it as their own.
[82] At the same time, lawyers must assure that the organization they hire
adequately protects the client’s confidences. This duty might involve
confirming that the foreign lawyers’ ethics are compatible with ours, and
may also require some analysis of the confidentiality precautions and
technologies that the foreign organization uses. Meanwhile, lawyers
arranging outsourcing should avoid conflicts of interest.209 At the very
least the lawyers should assure that the organization handling the
outsourced work is not working for the adversary as well.210 Some of the
bars warn lawyers to take this step to avoid the inadvertent disclosure of
confidential communications rather than to avoid conflicts.211
[83] With the aforementioned steps in mind, lawyers must bill
appropriately.212 As explained earlier, if the lawyers are not “adding
value” to the outsourced workers, they should pass along the outsourcing
bill directly to their client as an expense. In such a situation, a lawyer may
generally add overhead expenses to the bill.213 The ABA notes, however,
that there will be very few overhead expenses in pursing a foreign
outsourcing operation.
[84] Lastly, lawyers usually must advise their clients that they are
involving another organization in their work.214 As various legal ethics
opinions explain, such disclosure may not be required if the contract or
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See id.
See id. R. 1.7(a).
210
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211
See, e.g., The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. On Prof’l and Judicial
Ethics, Formal Op. 2001-1 (2001).
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See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2000).
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ABA Standing Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451
(2008).
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See id.
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temporary lawyers act under the direct supervision of the law firm.215
Nevertheless, disclosure is always best, and almost surely would be
required in a situation involving a foreign law organization.216 For
instance, the ABA indicated that the lawyer’s lack of immediate
supervision and control over foreign service providers means that they
must obtain the client’s consent to send work overseas.217 The North
Carolina Bar indicated that lawyers arranging for outsourcing must always
obtain their clients’ written informed consent.218 Unlike the issue of
metadata and the inadvertent transmission of electronic communications,
state bars have reached a general consensus on the ethical permissibility of
foreign outsourcing. It will be interesting to see if the market drives law
firms and their clients to keep expanding that practice.
B. DUTY TO RETAIN E-MAIL COMMUNICATIONS
[85] The obligation of any litigant, or possible litigant, to preserve
potentially responsive evidence obviously does not present a new issue.
Conversely, the enormous volume of electronic communications clearly
makes the analysis more difficult, and exacerbates the possible burden. It
should go without saying that litigants must preserve potentially
responsive documents, including electronic ones.219 The duty obviously
arises before a discovery request arrives and can also arise before
litigation begins.220
[86] The most widely quoted standard comes from the Southern District
of New York.221 In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg (Zubulake I),222 the United
States District for the Southern District of New York court held that “the
obligation to preserve evidence arises . . . when a party should have known
that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.”223 Furthermore, the
215
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court found that officials at UBS Warburg were on notice that the plaintiff
might sue the company for gender discrimination, thus triggering the
preservation duty.224
[87] In discussing the scope of a company’s duty to preserve, the
Zubulake I court rejects a blanket duty:
Must a corporation, upon recognizing the threat of
litigation, preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or
electronic document, and every backup tape? The answer
is clearly, “no.”
Such a rule would cripple large
corporations, like UBS, that are almost always involved in
litigation. As a general rule, then, a party need not preserve
all backup tapes even when it reasonably anticipates
litigation.225
Instead, the court explained that a company that anticipates being sued
“must not destroy unique, relevant evidence that might be useful to an
adversary.”226 The court held that the preservation duty extends to all
“key players” in the anticipated litigation.227
[88] Later, in Zubulake II,228 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York reaffirmed that UBS should have preserved
electronic documents that were ultimately destroyed.229 It again ordered
UBS Warburg to pay the cost of the plaintiff’s motion, directed the
company to reimburse plaintiff for the costs of any depositions or redepositions necessitated by the document destruction, and approved a jury
instruction containing an adverse inference about the destroyed back-up
tapes.230
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[89] Other courts have essentially adopted the same standard, although
sometimes using different language.231 Large companies have found
themselves severely punished for destroying electronic documents under
this standard. For instance, a court ordered Philip Morris to pay $2.75
million as a sanction for not preserving relevant e-mails, and also
prohibited Philip Morris from relying on the testimony of any of its
executives who had not saved their e-mails.232 Morgan Stanley also lost a
highly publicized Florida state court case involving allegations of
document spoliation.233 The verdict against Morgan Stanley was
approximately $1.5 billion.234 In perhaps the most frightening new
development, a court pointed to a litigant’s work product claim, reflected
on its privilege log, as triggering a duty to have preserved pertinent
documents— starting on the day that the company created the purportedly
work-product protected document.235
231
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LEXIS 23517, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2005):
A duty to preserve evidence arises when the party in possession of the
evidence is notified of its relevance. A party is on notice once it
receives a discovery request or the complaint alerts the party that
certain information will likely be sought in discovery. However, “the
obligation to preserve evidence even arises prior to the filing of a
complaint where a party is on notice that litigation is likely to be
commenced.”
Id. See generally Anderson v. Sotheby’s Inc. Severance Plan, No. 04 Civ. 8180 (SAS)
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withheld documents “appear” to be documents that the defendants created in the

48

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 4

[90] Another court addressed a situation in which a defendant accused of
spoliation argued that it had not anticipated litigation until 2002, which
was after it had destroyed the pertinent documents.236 When the defendant
claimed work product protection for documents created before 2002, the
plaintiff argued against such protection.237 The court rejected plaintiff’s
argument, noting that “the court made no finding with regard to alleged
spoliation or anticipation of litigation that would serve to penalize
[defendant] Great Lakes from making any claim of work-product privilege
for documents created prior to filing suit.”238 Although it was not stated as
bluntly as it could, this decision essentially declined to equate the mental
states: (1) required to assert work product protection, and (2) triggering
the duty to save responsive documents.239
[91] The law concerning the duty to retain email communications is
evolving. Unfortunately, the law in this area has not yet reached a point
where companies can make rational decisions about exactly when to begin
preserving e-mails, and the scope of the preservation. No court seems to
have required companies to preserve all of their e-mails simply because
they might at some point be sued. On the other hand, a company’s duty to
preserve electronic communication begins before a company files a
lawsuit, or is sued by a plaintiff.240
[92] It appears that courts might use the same “trigger” date for the duty
to preserve electronic communication as they use when assessing a work
product claim. Companies should keep this in mind before picking an
aggressively early date to begin a work product protection claim. Recent
changes to Rules 16 and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will
presumably focus companies’ attention on this matter, which might reduce
the likelihood that companies will find themselves in this position.
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CONCLUSION
[93] Because today’s lawyers are trying to deal with the changes triggered
by the expanding use of e-mails, it might be difficult for all of them to see
what a dramatic change they represent. It will be interesting to see how
the ethics rules continue to adapt as new forms of electronic
communications supplement, or even replace e-mails. With texting,
instant messaging, and new forms of instant communication expanding,
we may soon look back at the era of e-mails as the “good old days” when
ethics rules could adequately address modern technology.
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